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H. 291: OHIO'S

ATTEMPT TO REMEDY

SECURITY INTERESTS IN FARM PRODUCTS UNDER THE UCC

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Ohio and elsewhere, problems in the enforcement of security
interests in farm products have pitted agricultural lenders against buyers of farm products in a battle over which should bear the risk of
potential loan defaults by producers. 1 These problems arise when a producer, who has used farm products to secure a loan, sells the collateral
and fails to apply the proceeds to repayment of the outstanding debt.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code2 (UCC), the'secured lender may
then seek recovery from the producer's buyer, 3 usually under a theory
of conversion. 4 The buyer therefore risks paying twice for the same
farm products--once to the producer upon the initial sale, and later to
the lender.
The Ohio General Assembly has grappled with this problem twice
in less than a year, culminating in the recent revision to the UCC in
House Bill 291.5 In this latest round of debate, buyers of farm products
have apparently emerged victorious. H. 291 completely restructured
the notification system of security interests in farm productss in Ohio
and allowed buyers to purchase farm products free of any security interests in certain situations. In effect, the risk of a producer's default
has been shifted toward agricultural lenders.
This note will survey the underlying problems of security interests
I. The term "producer" will be used throughout this note to refer to a farmer who has
pledged his farm products as collateral for a loan. The "producer," therefore, is both a debtor and
a seller of farm products.
2. U.C.C. § 9-307(l) (1972).
3. See United States v. Pete Brown Enters., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 734, 740
(N.D. Miss. 1971) (holding in part that exhaustion of remedies against the defaulting producer is
not a prerequisite to maintaining an action against the buyer).
4. See, e.g., United States v. McClesky Mills, Inc., 409 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Greenwich Mill & Elevator Co., 291 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ohio 1968); Vermilion County
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Izzard, 11I Ill. App. 2d 190, 249 N.E.2d 352 (1969); Garden City Prod.
Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 186 N.W.2d 99 (1971).
5. Act of June 30, 1983, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-97 (Baldwin). House Bill 291 was Ohio's
budget appropriations bill for 1984 to 1985. The UCC revisions became part of the bill because of
a denial of funding for a centralized filing computer system. See infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
The revisions to the UCC can be found at Act of June 30, 1983, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-97,
5-120 (Baldwin) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1309.26, 1309.38 (Page Supp. 1983)).
For purposes of this note, reference to H. 291 will only concern these revisions to the UCC. To
cross-reference sections of the Ohio Revised Code to their corresponding UCC sections, see the
conversion table provided at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 1309, at 423 (Page 1979).
6. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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in farm products as well as summarize the provisions of H. 291. Finally, an analysis of the theory and application of H. 291 will be offered in an attempt to assess whether the general assembly has actually
formulated a viable solution to this perplexing problem.
II.

BACKGROUND--WHY

ALL THE Fuss?

An understanding of the problems with security interests in farm
products requires scrutiny of the changing nature of American agriculture. By way of background, it will also be necessary to examine why
the Ohio General Assembly discarded its original solution of centralized filing.
A.

Changing Nature of Agriculture

The UCC allows buyers in the ordinary course of business to
purchase goods free of any security interest in those goods. An explicit
exception, however, is provided for buyers of farm products. Farmproduct buyers are subject to all perfected security interests created by
the seller in those products.
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section 1-201)
other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in
farming operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller
even though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer
7
knows of its existence.
An initial question, of course, is why the drafters of article 9 incorporated the "buyer of farm products" exception into the UCC at all.
The question regrettably defies any definite answer. Perhaps the underlying problem was that the drafters of the UCC were well oriented
toward traditional commercial law, but lacked technical expertise in
agricultural financing.8 As a result, farmers were misconceived as
"nonbusiness" persons. 9
Essentially, the exception in 9-307 reflects a philosophy that a
farmer who borrows on his inventory cannot be trusted to turn over the
proceeds from its sale in the way a lender has learned to trust other
businessmen to do. The buyer of farm products, not the lender, must

7. U.C.C. § 9-307(l) (1972) (emphasis added).
8. Coogan & Mays, Crop Financingand Article 9: A Dialogue with Particular Emphasis
on the Problems of Florida Citrus Crop Financing,22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 13, 17 (1967).
9. See Miller, Farm Collateral under the UCC: "'Those Are Some Mighty Tall Silos, Ain't
They Fella?," 2 AGRIC. L.J. 253 (1980-81). The author states that "[tihe Code approaches farming as an occupation peopled by simple, unsophisticated tillers of the soil who need the mantle of
protective legislation to survive; it evidences a similar attitude toward the sophistication of the
farm lender." Id. at 254 (footnote omitted).
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take the risk that the seller does not live up to his promise.'"
The farm-products exception contained in the UCC is basically a
result of evolving pre-Code practice." Under the early common law, a
2
security interest in crops not yet planted was null and void. Beginning
in the late 1800's, legislation appeared at the state level permitting
3
these crop mortgages, but such laws were nonuniform.' With the entry
of the federal government into the farm credit scene in the 1930's, a
majority of states were persuaded to amend their laws to provide for
present liens on future crops14 and to give the perfected lender priority
over the producer's later buyer."5 It was against this background that
the drafters of article 9 adopted the farm-products exception. Article 9
merely granted uniform formality to common-law principles that had
developed in the years prior to the drafting of the UCC.
Although various commentators have dispelled all of the likely jus17
tifications"6 for the farm-products exception, the provision continues
as part of the UCC. As early as 1970, the exception was thought to be

in need of revision because of the problems it posed for buyers of farm

products. The article 9 review committee, heeding the criticism of commentators and buyers that the rule was impractical under modern agricultural conditions, recommended that the farm-products exception be
removed from the UCC.'8 Apparently fearing that such a revision

10.

Coogan & Mays, supra note 8, at 19.

2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 32.2, at 858-60 (1965).
12. See Gittings v. Nelson, 86 Iii. 591 (1877); Long v. Hines, 40 Kan. 220, 19 P. 796
(1888); Cudworth v. Scott, 41 N.H. 456 (1860).
13. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 11, § 32.2, at 860.
14. Note, Mortgages on Future Crops as Security for Government Loans, 47 YALE L.J. 98,
99-100 (1937). These laws were very diverse from state to state, some only granting the privilege
of present liens to federal lending agencies. Id. at 108. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1319.09
(repealed 1962).
15. See United States v. Fontenot, 33 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. La. 1940); Four County Agricultural Credit Corp. v. Satterfield, 218 N.C. 298, 10 S.E.2d 914 (1940); Alexandria Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Horn, 199 So. 430 (La. Ct. App. 1941).
16. There are two commonly propounded justifications for the farm-products exception: a
favorable lending rule is essential to assuring credit because of the unique nature of farm enterprises; and buyers of farm products are sophisticated professionals who are fully aware of the freemarket exception. Buyers are, therefore, constructively on notice to protect themselves. Dolan,
Section 9-307(l): The U.C.C.'s Obstacle to Agricultural Commerce in the Open Market, 72 Nw.
U.L. REv. 706, 716-17 (1977).
17. It is beyond the scope of this note to discredit the initial inclusion of the farm-products
exception or any justifications for its retention. For an excellent discussion of the weak character
of justifications for the § 9-307(1) exception, see Dolan, supra note 16; Hawkland, The Proposed
Amendment to Article 9 of the U.C.C.-Part 1: Financingthe Farmer,76 CoM. L.J. 416 (1971);
Miller, supra note 9; Sorelle, "Farm Products" under the UCC-Is a Special Classification Desirable?, 47 TEX. L. REV. 309 (1969).
18. U.C.C. § 9-307, at 16, 81 (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 1970) (Review Committee for
article 9 of the UCC).
1!.
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would lead to disunity among the states 9 or that federal lenders would
push Congress for preemptive protection,2" the Permanent Editorial
Board retained the exception."
Despite continued misconceptions of American agriculture2 2 and
seemingly weak justifications for retaining the farm-products exception
in the modern setting of agricultural transactions,2 3 the problem of security interests in farm products persists. The basic concern with the
provision expressed by buyers is the impracticality-if not impossibility-of searching county filing records before purchasing farm products
to determine if there are any outstanding security interests in the products. 24 In the pre-Code years, not only were producers much less dependent on credit for operating capital, but farm-product transactions usually took place in local markets. Today the nation's transportation
infrastructure and bulk-hauling capabilities25 often encourage producers to seek premium market prices from buyers far removed from their
county of residence.
The historical notion of the American farmer as a mere tiller of
the soil is also antiquated. The "family farm"-while still the backbone
of American agriculture-has evolved from an era of subsistence farming into a modern, multi-billion-dollar annual industry. 6 As with any

19. While uniformity of laws among the states is a valid and essential goal of the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC, its fears of dissension are, nonetheless, becoming reality because
at least ten states have already altered the substance and effect of the farm-products exception.
These states include California, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Ohio, and Tennessee. Trethewey & McCorkle, Farm Products: UCC Changes Applicable
to Security Interests of Buyers and Sellers, 56 OHIO ST. B.A. REP. 1253, 1259 n.I (1983). For a
general discussion of some of the various state alternatives, see infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
20. To the contrary, legislation is currently pending in Congress that would preempt the
farm-products exception of the UCC. H.R. 3296, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
21. U.C.C. § 9-307, at 101, 209 (Final Report 1971) (Permanent Editorial Board of the
UCC).
22. Miller, supra note 9. See also infra notes 26-27.
23. Supra notes 19-20. See also Dolan, supra note 16.
24. Consider, for example, the burden placed on the operator of a large grain terminal that
accepts delivery each day from hundreds of producers from all over the state, as well as from
neighboring states, during the peak harvest season. The buyer could only assure self-protection by
searching records in numerous distant counties and other states. The problem is compounded for
livestock buyers. The Packers and Stockyards Act requires full payment for livestock before the
close of the next business day following the purchase. 7 U.S.C. § 228b(a) (1982).
25. Compare the present use of semitrailers as a common method of hauling farm products
to market with the hauling capabilities of producers in 1954. In 1954, approximately 40% of the
farm trucks had a load capacity of one-half ton or less. Less than 10% of the nation's farm trucks
had a rated capacity of over one and one-half tons. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE YEARBOOK OF
AGRICULTURE (1954).

26.

In 1982, the nation's farm sector controlled nearly $1.1 trillion worth of assets. The

total value of farm products in 1981 was almost $165 billion. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 661 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/13

LEGISLATION NOTES

19841

industry of great magnitude, agricultural producers require vast
amounts of credit to finance their operations.2 7 Consequently, the dilemma of security interests in farm products intensifies as agriculture
advances in sophistication.
The Ohio General Assembly* recently took notice of the agricultural buyer's plight. The legislature initially sought a remedy that
would address the burden of impractical lien searches without altering
the favorable position of agricultural lenders.
B.

The Rise and Fall of Centralized Filing in Ohio

Prior to H. 291, the Ohio General Assembly adopted a centralized
filing system of security interests in farm products in late 1982.28 The
centralized filing plan imposed an additional filing requirement on

Ohio's existing local filing system of farm-product liens. Under this du-

al filing system, a lender could perfect a security interest in farm prod-9
ucts only by filing both locally and with the secretary of state's office.

This provision avoided the controversy8" between advocates of local recording and proponents of a centralized system by satisfying the needs

of both. A party who needed credit information could access the system

that it found most convenient.

In adopting the centralized filing system, the general assembly ad-

dressed the farm-products problem in an equitable manner and seemingly laid the issue to rest. Lenders did not relinquish their favored

security status granted under the farm-products exception. Buyers had
a potentially viable solution to the impractical burden of local lien
searches. If the secretary of state's office could have developed an efficient and reliable system of retrieving lien information, buyers might

have discovered farm-product encumbrances in a timely manner.

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].

Agriculture is also Ohio's largest industry with approximately 96,000 farms producing
nearly $3.0 billion worth of farm products in 1978. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1978 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE-OHIO 88 (1981).
27. Agricultural producers in the United States had outstanding debts totalling approximately $195 billion in 1982, $92.8 billion of which was not real estate-related. Their net cash
income in the same year was $80 billion. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 26, at 662. With the
advent of deregulation, many large banks and savings and loan institutions are moving into the
agricultural credit area, especially for production-type loans. Why Big Banks, S&Ls Want Your
Credit Business, SUCCESSFUL FARMING, Sept. 1983, at 34-R.
28. Centralized filing was an ancillary amendment in H. 770. Act of Nov. 17, 1982, 1982
Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-459, 5-466 (Baldwin), repealed by Act of June 30, 1983, 1983 Ohio Legis.
Serv. 5-97, 5-120 (Baldwin).
29. Id.
30. For a general discussion of the controversy between local and centralized filing, see
U.C.C. § 9-401 comment 1 (1972). Ohio has adopted the third alternative of § 9-401(1). OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.38(A) (Page 1979).
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In the early summer of 1983, however, the legislature repudiated
the concept of centralized filing in Ohio. This seemingly equitable solution to the farm-products problem met its demise through unfortunate
timing" and budgetary constraints.3" The centralized filing plan was
not discarded on the merits of the plan itself, but rather because of
issues extraneous to the heart of the initial problem. The farm-products
exception had once again become a major focal point of debate in

Ohio.

The general assembly was again forced to consider the various options available to deal with the problem. The most obvious course of
action was to return to the pre-1982 system of local filing without altering the farm-products exception. Buyers of farm products, however,
had previously found local filing unacceptable.33 Another alternative
was to delete the exception entirely, but lenders viewed this as a devastating remedy.34 The final option was to adopt an innovative plan that
would justly address the concerns of all parties. What emerged in H.
291 was an untested method of dealing with the problems of security
interests in farm products.3 5
III.

H.

2

91-PROVISIONS OF THE BILL

H. 291 initially appears to be a very cumbersome statutory scheme
31. See White, Bushels ofLiens to File, OHIO FARMER, July 1983, at 7. The major
problem
was that centralized filing of farm products was to begin on January I, 1984,
and the secretary of
state's office was still trying to function under an outdated manual filing system.
See also Interview with Wayne West, director of the UCC department of the Ohio secretary
of state's office
(July 15, 1983) [hereinafter cited as West interview] (on file with University
of Dayton Law
Review).
32. See White, supra note 31; Lafferty, Banks Oppose Exemption Elimination,
Columbus
Dispatch, May 24, 1983, at A8, col. 1. The Ohio General Assembly could
not find sufficient
monies in the tight state budget to fund the computerization process and
therefore denied the
secretary of state's request for approximately $1.9 million. West interview,
supra note 31.
33. See Letter from Dale W. Fallat, manager of Law and Government
Affairs for The
Andersons, to Thomas M. O'Diam (Sept. 26, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Fallat letter] (on file
with University of Dayton Law Review); Letter from George G. Greenleaf,
executive vice president of the Ohio Grain & Feed Association, to Thomas M. O'Diam (Sept. 15,
1983) [hereinafter
cited as Greenleaf letter] (on file with University of Dayton Law Review);
Letter from Mark C.
Stewart, legal counsel for the Ohio Farmer Cooperative, to Thomas M. O'Diam
(Oct. 28, 1983)
[hereinafter cited at Stewart letter] (on file with University of Dayton Law
Review).
34. See Letter from Jim Doerstler, regional vice president of the Federal
Intermediate
Credit Bank of Louisville, to Thomas M. O'Diam (Sept. 13, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Doerstler
letter] (on file with University of Dayton Law Review); Letter from Donald
F. Huston, president
of the Cambridge, Ohio Protection Credit Association, to Thomas M. O'Diam
(Sept. 26, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Huston letter] (on file with University of Dayton Law
Review); Letter from
Jeffrey D. Quayle, executive director and staff counsel for the Ohio Bankers
Association, to
Thomas M. O'Diam (Oct. 20, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Quayle letter] (on
file with University
of Dayton Law Review).
35. H. 291 was essentially derived from the "Indiana Plan." IND. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1-9-307
(West Supp. 1983). See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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for dealing with security interests in farm products. Further examination, however, reveals that the mechanics of the bill are fairly simple
and straightforward."6 The basic thrust of the bill is that the producer
37
must notify his or her lender of potential buyers of the products. The
lender, in turn, must notify the potential buyers that the products are
subject to a security interest and the buyers must comply with the
lender's instructions on payment procedures.38
A.

Overview-The Basic Principle

A buyer who in the ordinary course of business 9 purchases farm
products from a person engaged in farming operations is not subject to
any security interest created by the seller in those products unless the
buyer has received actual written notice40 of the perfected security interest from the lender, and the buyer fails to make payment in accordance with the notice instructions. 4' The written notice is effective for
only eighteen months."" The buyer takes free of the security interest if
43
he or she otherwise has knowledge that a security interest exists, but
is subject to that interest only if he or she is also aware that the sale
violates some portion of the security agreement that has not been
waived by the secured lender. 4 This is a sharp deviation from prior law
6
where such buyers took subject to all properly recorded' security interests created by the seller in the farm products.' In a nutshell, mere
perfection by local filing will no longer protect the secured party from
the initial buyers of the producer's products.
H. 291 also expands the definition of a "buyer of farm products"
to include buying and selling agents.' 7 This is an important expansion
because many farm-product transactions occur through agents. 48 This
36. For an excellent synopsis of the provisions and policies of H. 291, see Trethewey &
McCorkle, supra note 19.
37. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1983).
38. Id. § 1309.26(B)(1).
39. Id. § 1301.01(I) (Page 1979). For purposes of this note, a buyer of farm products will
be assumed to be a "buyer in ordinary course" unless otherwise indicated.
40. See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
41. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(1)(b) (Page Supp. 1983).
42. Id. § 1309.26(B)(l)(a).
43. Id.§ 1309.26(B)(1).
44. See U.C.C. § 9-307 comment 2 (1972).
45. In Ohio, the proper place to file a security interest in farm products is in the recorder's
office in the county of the producer's residence. If the collateral is crops, the security interest must
also be filed in the county where the land is located. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.38(A)(1)
(Page 1979).
46. Id.§ 1309.26(A).
47. Id. § 1309.26(B)(5) (Page Supp. 1983).
48. Livestock transactions in Ohio almost always take place through agents. Trethewey &
McCorkle, supra note 19, at 1257.
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provision subjects agents to the same statutory duties and affords them
the same statutory protections as are given to purchasers for value. The
expanded definition should obviate needless litigation over whether a
party is a true buyer or simply a commissionman. 9
Under the new law, buyers are not liable to their sellers for complying in good faith with all written notices they receive within eighteen months prior to paying for the farm products.50 A buyer's compliance with a joint payment instruction, for example, is not actionable by
the producer even though the producer may believe that the lender has
no right to a joint payment at the time of sale. This provision allows a
buyer to rely on the validity of the security interest and any reasonable
payment instructions contained in the written notice without fear of
suit by the producer.5
B.

The Written Notice

H. 291 establishes six elements which are necessary to constitute
sufficient written notice to the buyer.5 2 The required elements apparently are not an exhaustive list of the information a lender may want to
include in the written notice. However, the basic written notice section
seems adaptable to a simplified "form notice."'53 The statute does not
state whether strict compliance with each element is essential to create
a valid written notice, or whether minor deviations will defeat the actual notice and allow the buyer to take free of the security interest.5
The written notice must contain some type of instruction dictating
the manner in which the buyer is to make payment for the purchased
goods.5' The new law specifically allows the lender to instruct the buyer
to make payments jointly to the producer and the lender.5 6 Any other
reasonable5" instructions regarding payment methods will also suffice.5 8
49. See, e.g., United States v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956). See also 2 G. GILMORE, supra note i1,at
711.
50. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(1), (2), (3) (Page Supp. 1983).
51. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
52. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1983).
53. Forms could be used not only to notify buyers of a lender's security interest, but also to
solicit the producer's list of potential buyers and to supplement security agreements when necessary. See infra note 59.
54. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
55. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(2)(e) (Page Supp. 1983).
56. Id.
57. H. 291 does not attempt to define what may be a "reasonable" payment instruction. A
reasonable payment instruction could conceivably extend as far as payment directly to the lender
if the producer had previously consented to such an instruction in either the security agreement or
the written notice to the buyer. See infra note 59.
58. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(2)(e) (Page Supp. 1983).
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The notice to the buyer must also either provide a copy of the
security agreement which authorizes the lender to request joint or reasonable payment, or the producer must sign and date the actual written
notice to the buyer.59 In the event a security agreement does not accompany the written notice, the producer's signature is required on the
notice to evidence his assent to the stipulated instructions. These procedures provide the basis for a buyer's good-faith compliance with the
written notice which will render him or her free from liability to the
producer.0
C.

The List of Potential Buyers

Under the new law, a lender has the right to request a written list
of the producer's potential buyers.6 1 The producer has a statutory duty
62
to comply with any such request from his or her lender. The producer
is additionally prohibited from selling his or her farm products to a
buyer who does not appear on the list of potential buyers without written consent from the lender prior to the sale.6" Any sale to a buyer not
listed would defeat the lender's security interest as to that buyer."
The producer has the right to amend the list of potential buyers by
sending written notice to the lender before the producer sells his or her
5
farm products to a buyer who was not originally on the list. The written amendment must reach the lender at least fifteen days prior to the
sale in order to comply with the statute. 66 Once the lender has received
the written amendment, it is the lender's responsibility to provide the
newly listed buyer with actual notice of the security interest within the
fifteen-day time limit.6 7 Failure to make a timely written notice to the
new buyer will cause the lender to lose its secured position against that
buyer.
A producer is subject to criminal sanctions if the producer sells his
or her farm products to any buyer who does not properly appear on the
list of potential buyers.6" These penalties can be invoked in three situa59. Id. § 1309.26(B)(2)(f). A lender may only request payments directly to itself or jointly
with the producer if the producer had previously agreed to such a provision. Id. § 1309.45 (Page
1979).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
61.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1983).

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
65. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1983).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. § 1309.26(B)(8). A first-degree misdemeanor in Ohio carries a penalty of not more
than six months in prison or not more than a $1,000 fine, or both. Id. § 2929.21(B)(1), (C)(1)
(Page 1982).
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tions. One possibility is the case of the producer who fails to provide a
requested list of potential buyers to the lender, but who sells the farm
products nonetheless. A second situation is the producer who provides
the initial list of potential buyers, but who sells to a nonlisted buyer
without the lender's prior consent. The final possibility arises when a
producer provides an original list and properly initiates an amendment,
but sells the farm products without the lender's consent prior to the
expiration of the fifteen-day waiting period."
D.

Ancillary Provisions

H. 291 contains a unique privacy provision which prohibits the
dissemination of any producer's name that appears in a notice sent to
the potential buyer.7 0 This confidentiality is significant inasmuch as the
purpose of the new law was to alleviate the buyer's impractical task of
searching local filings by giving them special notice. 7 It was not intended to create a credit clearinghouse for the general public. Only the
potential buyer and its agents and employees are privy to the informa7
tion contained in the written notice. 2
The bill also emphasizes that the new law does not affect perfection or nonperfection of security interests. Local filing is still essential
to perfect 73 a security interest in farm products and to establish priority7 4 between creditors who may seek a share of the producer's collateral or proceeds. H. 291 imposes an additional notice requirement on
buyers of farm products only to the extent necessary to subject those
specific buyers to the lender's security interest.
Even actual notice from the lender to a buyer, however, does not
establish priority over that buyer if the lender has not otherwise attached7 5 and perfected his or her security interest in the farm products.7 6 Actual written notice alone does not constitute perfection as to
any notified buyer. A particular buyer who has been notified by the
lender may, however, still be subject to the lender's security interest
because the buyer would have knowledge of the security interest and

69. Id. § 1309.26(B)(8) (Page Supp. 1983). For a discussion of the wisdom and potential
effectiveness of these criminal provisions, see infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
70. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(6) (Page Supp. 1983).
71. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text; Trethewey & McCorkle supra note 19,
,
at 1256-57.
72. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(6) (Page Supp. 1983).
73. Id. § 1309.21 (Page 1979).
74. Id. § 1309.31.
75. Id. § 1309.14.
76. A buyer of farm products takes priority over an unperfected security interest only if the
buyer gives value and lacks knowledge of the security interest. Id. § 1309.20(A)(3). Actual written notice to the buyer, however, would establish knowledge of the lender's security interest.
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may be aware that the sale violates some term of the security agreement.77 A buyer who simply follows the payment instructions contained
in the written notice should avoid any possible problems in any event.

IV.

ANALYSIS

Under H. 291, the Ohio General Assembly has sought to remedy
the problem of security interests in farm products by opening new lines
of communication between lenders, buyers, and producers. 8 The success of H. 291 appears dependent upon the extent to which these paramong the parties
ties cooperate with one another; lack of cooperation
7
could spell disaster for the entire system. 1
A.

Potential Problem Areas

H. 291 does not address the issue of whether a single written notice to one buyer in an incorporated business with multiple locations
would constitute sufficient notice to all other buyers in the corporation.80 Viewing the corporation as a single entity, the "buyer," for purposes of the statute, could mean the corporation as a whole.8 1 Consequently, notification to one division of a buyer corporation might be
effective against all other branches of the corporation. This result
would mandate extensive intercorporate communication and intensify
each division's need for a reliable record management system.
A problem that existed under the prior law and which was not
resolved by H. 291 is how a buyer can determine whether the farm
products he or she is purchasing are, in fact, the products subject to the
lender's security interest. 82 This problem could arise, for instance, if a

77.

Id. See also U.C.C. § 9-307 comment 2 (1972); supra notes 39-44 and accompanying

text.
78. It is inevitable that buyers will have to establish reliable recordkeeping systems in order
to accurately assess the status of each producer-seller in a timely manner. Lenders will also have
to maintain sufficient records to substantiate that notices were served and are currently in effect.
79. See infra notes 100-09 and accompanying text. Consider also the effect on producers if
lenders require alternative collateral and refuse to accept farm products as security. Additionally,
consider the potential deterioration of lenders' secured positions if producers fail to provide thorough lists of potential buyers.
80. For example, many livestock buyers and grain dealers are incorporated associations with
a central office, but with numerous branches scattered throughout the state that do the actual
buying of farm products.
81. See 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 814.1, at
78 (1975); American Standard Credit, Inc. v. National Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248 (5th Cir.
1981). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1301.01(AA) (Page 1979).
82. By definition, grain, as a fungible good, is indistinguishable from any other good of that
kind. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1301.01(Q) (Page 1979).
A real estate description in the buyer's written notice would be a futile attempt to resolve the
buyer's uncertainty unless the law imposed a duty on the buyer to oversee the actual grain harvest. See Fallat letter, supra note 33. H. 291 clearly imposes no such duty. Although livestock are
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producer rents land on a share basis with a landlord, or when a portion
of the producer's operation is conducted under a joint venture. 83 If the
buyer of such farm products has received a written notice from the
producer's lender, the buyer should probably resolve the uncertainty by
complying in good faith with the lender's payment instructions. The
buyer could then assume that his or her purchase was free of any security interest 4 without being liable to the producer for making payment in accordance with the lender's instructions.8 5
An additional issue left unresolved by the passage of H. 291 is the
determination of who must solve questions of priority when a buyer is
faced with two or more written notices from lenders who claim a security interest in the same collateral. A buyer of farm products is required
to make payment for the goods "to the debtor and each notifying secured party"" in compliance with the stipulated payment instructions.
This apparently indicates that the lenders and the producer, or ultimately the court, are to resolve priority questions-not the buyer. This
result is imperative if the buyer must rely in good faith on all written
notices received from lenders.87 A buyer'should therefore make a single
payment jointly to the producer and all of the notifying lenders. 88
Perhaps even more significant is the potential effect of the fifteenday amending notice provision89 on a producer during a rapidly changing market. It is in the lender's best interest to permit the producer to
sell the farm products at the highest net price, but the highest net price
may be offered by a buyer who does not appear on the original list. The
key to the solution of this problem is that a sale to a nonlisted buyer is
only prohibited before the expiration of the fifteen-day amending period "[w]ithout the prior written consent of the secured party." 9 Consequently, the producer may still take advantage of unexpected market

arguably nonfungible goods, they nevertheless defy positive identification absent permanent
branding.
83. A producer must have rights in the collateral in order to create a valid security interest.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.14(A)(3) (Page 1979). In these situations, a producer at best only
has rights in an undivided percentage of the collateral and, therefore, cannot pledge more rights
than what he or she has in that collateral.
84. Id. § 1309.26(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1983). See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
85. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(3) (Page Supp. 1983). See also supra notes
50-51 and accompanying text.
86. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(I)(b) (Page Supp. 1983) (emphasis added).
87. Id. § 1309.26(B)(3).
88. See also Trethewey & McCorkle, supra note 19, at 1260 n.7 (a buyer may alternatively
deposit the payment into an escrow account until the producer and his or her lenders resolve the
problem).
89. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1983). See supra notes 61-67 and
accompanying text.
90. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1983).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/13

19841

LEGISLATION NOTES

variations by obtaining the lender's written consent and selling the
products immediately. The lender will obviously want to be sure the
new buyer is notified prior to the actual sale in order to retain its secured position. This is a prime example of how the new law can work
91
effectively through cooperation among the parties.
The wisdom and potential effectiveness of the criminal sanctions
provision9 2 of H. 291 are questionable. Although the imposition of crim9
inal liability in a commercial setting is not unique to this legislation, "
its deterrent effect in the farm-products situation is likely to be minimal. One wonders how many elected prosecutors in a rural community
would find it politically appealing to pursue this criminal action against
a farm producer.9 4 If this provision is not actively enforced, its deterrent effect will be reduced to a feeling of "mental guilt."
Most of the mechanical problems of H. 291 have workable solutions. However, as the following section will discuss, the ramifications
of H. 291 go beyond strict statutory application.
B.

Shifting the Risk-Theory and Reality

If a goal of commercial law be the promotion of efficient uses of
resources, the party in the best position to minimize a risk at the lowest
95
possible cost should be assigned the cost of bearing the risk. In theory, the allocation of resources in a voluntary transaction is presumed
to achieve a net increase in efficiency. 96 But when law imposes an involuntary shift of resources, or likewise, a shift in risk, it becomes difficult
to determine if the result enhances efficiency?9
In the farm-products situation, the cost of bearing the risk of a
producer's default will be passed on to the producer, and ultimately to
the consumer, regardless of whether the lender or the buyer initially
carries the risk. That is, if the buyer bears the risk, the producer should
receive lower market prices for his or her product. Because of the shift

91. This problem could often be resolved by the producer making the original list of buyers
as complete as possible because H. 291 does not limit the number of potential buyers a producer
may list. Id.

92. Id.§ 1309.26(B)(8).
93. See id.§§ 1333.99, 1345.99, 1347.99 (Page 1979).
94. This question also extends to local elected judges. The possibility of a jury, composed of
the producer's peers, finding liability is also questionable.
95. See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS-A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (5th Printing 1977); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
96. R. POSNER, supra note 95, at 10-12. A voluntary transaction is assumed to increase
efficiency because the parties would not have entered into the transaction if their respective positions would not have been enhanced. Id.
97. Id. Economic efficiency cannot be readily measured in this situation because it is uncertain what would have occurred if the parties had acted voluntarily. Id.
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in risk allocation away from the lender, the cost of obtaining credit,
however, should be reduced. Conversely, if the lender assumes the risk,
the producer should realize a higher market price, but also suffer a
higher cost of credit due to the lender's weakened security position.98
Economic efficiency will only be achieved if the risk of default is borne
by the party who can minimize the risk at the lowest cost. 99

The Ohio General Assembly has made a conscious determination

that agricultural lenders are in a better position to police the totality of
the transaction. 10 0 This does not necessarily mean that H. 291 achieves
the goal of efficient resource allocation because economic efficiency is
not easy to measure when involuntarily imposed by law. 0 1 H. 291
shifts the risk of default heavily, but not completely, 02 toward agricultural lenders. The provisions of H. 291 are economically feasible only if
the total cost' 03 of minimizing the risk of default under the new law is
less than the cost buyers incurred' 04 when they carried the risks
10 5
themselves.
The ultimate cost of Ohio's risk-shifting strategy may not only be
higher interest rates on borrowed capital, but also a drastic reduction in
the availability of the funds necessary to cover production expenses.
Agricultural lenders will probably require enhanced security by seeking

an interest in collateral other than, or in addition to, farm products. 0 "
98. Note that, in theory, when the risk is shifted to the lender, the cost of bearing the risk is
passed on to the producer and back to the buyer as the farm products proceed to the consumer.
But see infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
100. This may be because lenders have a better opportunity to scrutinize the producer at
the initial loan application and measure changes in his or her financial position throughout the
year. Buyers generally encounter producers only at the time of sale. Obviously, the lender is in the
business of credit and finance; the buyer is not.
101. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
102. Buyers still bear the risk of a producer's default to the extent that the buyer fails to
comply with the payment instructions in the written notice. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
1309.26(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1983). See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
103. Total cost includes the cost of additional "paperwork" for both lenders and buyers and
the potential cumulative costs of tightened credit experienced by producers under H. 291. See
infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
104. See Greenleaf letter, supra note 33 (estimating over $300,000 in losses due to mortgaged grain in 1982); Lafferty, Banks Oppose Exemption Elimination, Columbus Dispatch, May
24, 1983, at A8, col. I (indicating livestock buyers lost hundreds of thousands of dollars in the
past two years and grain elevator losses exceeded one million dollars).
105. The goal of economic efficiency will only be attained through H. 291 if the total cost to
initiate and operate a centralized filing system would have been more than the total cost of H.
291.
106. Lenders claim to have lost over $17 million due to producer loan defaults in 1982.
Consequently, lenders indicate that loan applications will be evaluated on an unsecured basis and
land, equipment, or cosigners will be required to secure loans. See Doerstler letter, supra note 34;
Huston letter, supra note 34; Quayle letter, supra note 34.
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The result may be that marginal and young producers will suffer even
greater economic hardship than they are currently experiencing, some
perhaps being pushed to the brink of collapse. 10 7 Agricultural producers
are not in the short term able to pass these increased costs of credit on
to the buyers of farm products because producers operate in a perfectly
competitive arena and must sell at the price set by the market.1" 8 One
consequence may be a significant setback to Ohio's agricultural
economy.10 9
H. 291 is a major step toward establishing parity between Ohio's
agricultural lenders and their counterparts in the commercial world.
The new law places most of the risk on the lender, the party who directly profits from the existence of the security interest. 11 0 But the potentially stringent tightening of agricultural credit could signal the demise of farm products as a major source of collateral for operating
loans.
C.

Comparative Law

There are presently three basic alternatives which various states
have enacted in an attempt to remedy the farm-products dilemma. 1 It
is important to remember, however, that the nature and extent of agricultural production differ markedly from state to state. Moreover, the
fiscal resources currently available to individual states to rectify
problems of notice filing, for instance, are by no means uniform across
the country.
The "Indiana Plan, 1 1 2 quite similar to Ohio's new act, addresses
the need for a viable solution to the farm-products problem, but suffers
from the same economic concerns as the Ohio provisions. 115 Indiana's
plan, like Ohio's, is of course dependent upon cooperation and commu-

107. Young and marginal producers will be most affected because they are generally highly
leveraged and, therefore, have little additional collateral to pledge for operating loans. Doerstler
letter, supra note 34.
108. See W. PETERSON, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS: MICRO 203-32 (1972). A "price
taker" is defined as a seller "which has no power to alter the price it receives for its product"
because he or she sells a product that is indistinguishable from the other products in the market
and the individual producer comprises only a minute portion of the total market. Id. at 203-04.
109. The degree of economic setback in Ohio will depend upon how stringent lenders actually become in granting production loans using farm products as collateral.
110. This is a major contention of buyers who believe that they should not bear any risk of
a producer's loan default because only the lender collects interest from the loan. See Greenleaf
letter, supra note 33.
1ll. For a list of the states that have changed the farm-products exception in some way, see
supra note 19. This note will only concentrate on three of the various alternatives that have been
enacted by different states.
112. IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9-307 (West Supp. 1983).
note 35. 1983
113. bySupra
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nication for success. The economic impact on producers in Indiana will
also depend upon how restrictive lenders become in extending loans secured by farm products.'
Until time and experience reveal the true
long-term effectiveness of this maverick solution, speculation will have
to suffice.
California completely abolished the "buyer of farm products" exception and thereby placed agricultural lenders in that state on a total
parity with other commercial lenders." 5 This solution may work well in
California because of the specialized nature of its agricultural production." 6 This approach, however, would be impractical under current
methods of agricultural financing in major states of traditional production. Lenders would of course be thoroughly unsecured with farm-product collateral vis-bt-vis buyers. The result would be chaos in the agricultural economy until lenders could adjust the structure of agricultural
7
finance to an affordable alternative.1
Iowa has apparently been successful in implementing a centralized
filing system for security interests in farm products." 8 A unique aspect
of the Iowa solution is a provision which provides various methods of
securing immediate access to the public filings.' 1 9 Private companies
are providing telephone search services 2 0 which are ripe for expansion
through the use of computer terminals. Iowa's centralized filing system
has promise as a long-term solution to the farm-products dilemma and
is perhaps a model for all major agricultural states. By utilizing the
latest technology, such a system provides an equitable method for addressing the concerns of both lenders and buyers.' 2' Computer terminals would provide lenders with security and also offer buyers a practical, readily available means of discovering encumberances prior to
purchasing farm products." 22 This plan is only as realistic and effective

114. The 1984 growing season should provide an excellent measuring stick of the economic
effects of these plans because 1984 will be the first full year the new statutes will have been in
effect in both Indiana and Ohio.
115. CAL. COM. CODE § 9307 (West Supp. 1983).
116. In 1981, California produced approximately 90% of the grapes grown in the United
States. California also accounted for 53% of the nation's vegetable production and ranked second
behind Florida in the production of citrus fruits. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS (1982).
117. Under H. 291, lenders will at least have a chance to consider prior dealings with individual producers and adjust their credit policies accordingly. In California, lenders may consider
each individual producer, but they still have no way to protect themselves from buyers of farm
products if the collateral for the loan is the farm products.
118. IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9401 (West Supp. 1982).
119. Id. § 554.9407(3).
120. One such private company is Iowa Public Record Search, Inc., of Des Moines, Iowa.
12 I. See Meyer, Marketing Farm Products: The Farmer as Debtor and Related Problems
of the Buyers of Farm Products, 4 AGRIC. L.J. 542, 556-58 (1983).
122. Id.
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as an individual state's resources permit, but Iowa seems to be proving
it can be an effective solution.
Federal legislation pending in Congress would adopt the California
solution by removing the farm-products exception entirely. 123 This is a
well-intentioned piece of legislation, but it has two serious flaws. First,
Congress is the wrong place to solve problems in the UCC. 12 ' The
proper body is the Commission on Uniform State Laws. 125 Second, the
preemptive effect of such legislation could cause potential devastation
1 26
of the agricultural economy in major agricultural states.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Ohio General Assembly is to be commended for taking the
initiative in trying to resolve the problem of security interests in farm
products. It is obvious that both agricultural lenders and buyers of
farm products need adequate protection to carry on their respective
businesses in the most efficient manner possible. To achieve this goal,
H. 291 promotes a system of interdependent cooperation and communication among lenders, buyers, and producers in an effort to further
minimize the risk of loan defaults by producers. The new law characterizes producers-the nexus between lenders and buyers-as the cornerstone in this communicative process.
Only time and experience can measure the actual success of this
endeavor. While H. 291 has properly addressed the legitimate grievances of buyers, it may have created additional problems. Agricultural
lenders now face a position of weakened security due to limited recourse in the event of an unauthorized sale of farm products. The ultimate cost of Ohio's risk-shifting scheme may be future escalation of
the economic difficulties already facing Ohio's agricultural producers.
H. 291 is a step in the right direction. A system of centralized
filing, however, remains a viable alternative if Ohio's latest remedy to
the farm-products problem fails to achieve its desired goals. The technology is now available to create an efficient method of searching farm
product liens in a timely manner. Under such a system the needs of all
factions-lenders, buyers, and producers-could be properly satisfied.
The cost of implementing a centralized filing system may in fact be
trivial compared to the potential economic disparity posed by H. 291.
Perhaps the perplexing dilemma of security interests in farm products is not amenable to a uniform solution. The varying nature of agri123. Supra note 20.
124. See Kripke, A Reflective Pause between UCC Past and UCC Future, 43 OHIO ST. L.J.
603, 604-06 (1982).
125. Id. at 603-06.
126. bySupra
notes 115-17
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culture from state to state and divergent fiscal resources may not permit any single remedy. Nevertheless, avoiding the problems created by
the farm-products exception in the UCC has only made them worse.
Perhaps the time has come for the Commission on Uniform State Laws
to make an intelligent and informed evaluation of the underlying
problems and formulate a workable alternative.
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